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They seem to satisfy their consciences with the doctrine
that God created the Africans to be slaves. What a libel
upon the heavenly Father, who "made of one blood all
nations of men!" And then who are Mricans? Who can
measure the amount of Anglo-Saxon blood coursing in
the veins of American slaves?
-- Harriet Jacobs

Incidents in The Life of a Slave Girl
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Harriet Jacobs' 1 Incidents in the Life of A Slave Girl is a text which,
written in a culture divided between polarities 2 of race and gender, has
continued in the 130 years of its reception to traverse a landscape of mutably
yet continually divided racisms and sexisms, changeably yet continually
cloven raced and gendered identities. The text itself, due to the legally and
socially constructed polar ontologies of race and gender in 19th century
America, is tom between what can be said and what can't, what is true and
what is false, what is black and what is white. The "tears" manifest
themselves on all levels, from the text's ambiguous manipulation of the
slave narrative genre and of the conventions of sentimentality, down to
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paradoxical statements housed in a single sentence. Readings of Incidents
have also been tom. From acceptance at "face value," that is, that Jacobs was
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1Jacobs wrote Incidents under a pseudonym, "Linda Brent," and many writers choose to
make a distinction between the writer and the narrative character. I recognize and find
very interesting the importance of this distinction, and see it as pertinent to the ideas I
will set out in this paper. However, for the sake of clarity, I have chosen to refer only
to "Harriet Jacobs" throughout.
2There has been a great deal of recent theorizing about institutionalized polarities.
Although lesbian and gay theories have very different grounds and goals than race
theories, Judith Butler's discussion of how systems of polarity work has been the most
helpful to my understanding. She describes how heterosexuality, in setting itself up as
the norm and the origin, demands the existence of homosexuality as an opposite and a
derivative: "The origin requires its derivations in order to affirm itself as an origin,
for origins only make sense to the extent that they are differentiated from that which
they produce as derivatives" (Butler, p 22). A polarity, in other words, relies on an
either/or system of extremes and oppositions and denies the possibility or existence of
any sort of both/and middle ground. Diana Fuss, writing about lesbian and gay theory,
speaks directly to the question of the fate of identities which lie between poles of
understanding: "Where exactly, in this borderline sexual economy, does the one identity
leave off and the other begin? And what gets left out of the inside/outside,
heterosexuaVhomosexual opposition, an opposition which could at least plausibly be said
to secure its seemingly inviolable dialectical structure only by assimilating and
internalizing other sexualities (bisexuality, transvestism, trassexualism . . .) to its own
rigid polar logic?" (Fuss, 2). Polarized understandings, in other words, make
"invisible," or even negate, spaces between.

Schneider, 2

the black fugitive slave she claimed to be, to readings which understood it as a
fiction by a white woman, to its recent recovery and revalorization as an
"authentic" slave narrative, the text has been read in radically contradictory
ways. This paper will be an examination of how the rendings and renderings
in the text, and the rendings and renderings of the text as it has been read,
suggest in the midst of their divisions spaces between polarities which have
the potential to reveal those polarities' construction.3 The text's many
slippages between categorical understandings, in other words, suggest possible
sites not of synthesis, but of ranges of understanding.
Antebellum American culture was, as contemporary American culture
still is, built on dualistic understandings supported by law and language.
"Race" has long been a cornerstone of this belief system for white Europeans
and Americans, with "black" and "white" occupying opposite ends of the
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chain of being. Thus in 1862, Abraham Lincoln told a group of black leaders
that "You and we are different races. We have between us a broader
difference than exists between any other two races" (Gates, 3). Never mind
that these two "races," divided by the broadest distance Lincoln could
imagine, mingled and mingled easily, mostly through the rape of slave

3A very interesting discussion of the "difference between" between and among may be
found in the American Heritage Dictionary. "Between is the only possible choice when
only two entities are involved: between (never among) good and evil. .. When more than
two entities are involved, the choice of between or among depends on the intended
meaning. Among is used to indicate that an entity has been chosen from the members of a
group: the first among (not between) equals. . . Among is also used to indicate a relation
of inclusion in a group... Between, on the other hand, is used to indicate the area
bounded by several points: We have narrowed the search to the area between (not
among) Philadelphia, Scranton, and New York. In other cases either between or among
may be used; ... one may say either that the boy was lost among the trees ("in the area
of the trees") or between the trees (in which case we infer that the trees hid the boy
from sight)." This range of meaning, in which between encompasses a space in the
middle of two polarities, circumscribes uncharted territory, and implies invisibility,
all work together to make "the space between" a resonant metaphor for what I am trying
to describe.

Schneider, 3
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women by slave owners, to the point where Jacobs could ask the question,
"who can measure the amount of Anglo-Saxon blood coursing in the veins of
American slaves" (Jacobs,43)? As Jacobs elsewhere points out, "No matter
whether the slave girl be as black as ebony or as fair as her mistress, in either
case, there is no shadow of law to protect her from insult, from violence, or
even from death" (Jacobs, 27). In other words, it is the law which polarizes
the understanding of race, not race which dictates the law. The words black
and white, when applied to race, thus become not descriptions of actual
appearance, but justifying metaphors for a system of legally sanctioned social
tyranny. Categorical language, which supports and naturalizes social and
legal constructions by eliding spectra of color and identity into polarized
definitions of black/white,4 thus creates an official ontology of the visible and
the understandable, which is an ontology of polarity. This ontology must, in
order to preserve its absolute bifurcation, "assimilate and internalize [other
permutations of 'race'] ... "to its own rigid polar logic," as Fuss says of
sexuality (Fuss, 2). Words and definitions thus function both to buttress legal
interdictions, in this case the antebellum laws surrounding race, and as
interdictions themselves, prohibit in their polarity the visibility of spaces
between and sanction the constant reconstruction of dichotomized

4Look at how Good/Evil, or Good vs. Evil, is written on the page. Something is needed to
symbolize the words' polarity~ This function is served by the versus symbol, or the
virgule, which in French means comma, but which in English means, according to the
dictionary, "the diagonal mark used to separate alternatives." The fact that something
must exist between two words in order to establish their polarity, creates an image on
the page not of two things, but of three: the two words, and a third thing that both unites
them and defines them over against one another. The virgule, I would argue, is the
physical reminder that there are spectra of meaning and colors between polar
oppositions such as good/evil and black/white, which fluidly connect them and thereby
undercut the logic which sets them in opposition. But the virgule is only a vestige, the
condensation of variety into a diagonal mark which signifies and ossifies polarity. But
as a vestige, this simple denotation destabilizes that opposition, simply because of its
necessity. The need for the virgule suggests the space between.
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understandings. Thus interdicted, the spaces between polarities are unsayable
and invisible.
Invisibility is an extremely important aspect of spaces between. A
spectrum of skin coloration may appear physically before the eyes, but the
physical evidence that "race" is not a biological absolute was not and still isn't
recognized or enacted culturally. Because interdicted into white/black poles,
the racial spectrum was in fact conceptually invisible.

Equally conceptually

invisible were the varieties of intelligence, beauty, sexual appetite, etc., which
were also polarized and assigned, depending on their desirability, to either
"white" or "black." In antebellum America, the maintenance of these
invisibilities under the rubric of the original black/white polarity was of
utmost importance to the preservation of the metaphor of "race" which
justified slavery. Not only voiced in the slave-states, polarizing justifications
for slavery can be found in the works of European philosophers whose works
were influential to or at least symptomatic of the white antebellum American
mood. 5 In 1753 the Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote: "I am apt to
suspect the negroes ... to be naturally inferior to the whites .... Such uniform
and constant difference could not happen... if nature had not made an
original distinction betwixt these breeds of men" (Gates, 10). Race,
determined by skin color and features, is made immutable (one is white or
"negroe") and a sign of "natural" status. Harriet Jacobs takes up this sort of
logic and suggests, in doing so, the space between the poles of superior and
inferior which reveals the way in which the enactment and reification of
polar understandings is constructed by the slave system itself: "I admit the
black man is inferior. But what is it that makes him so? It is the ignorance in
5Henry Louis Gates, Jr. uses Hume and other European philosophers in his discussion of
New World racism in his introduction to "Race," Writing and Difference.
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which white men compel him to live; it is the torturing whip that lashes
manhood out of him; it is the fierce bloodhounds of the South, and the
scarcely less cruel human bloodhounds of the north, who enforce the
Fugitive Slave Law. They do the work" Gacobs, 44). By saying "inferiority" is
a result of the laws of nature, Hume naturalizes a polarized understanding of
race. Jacobs, by stating very clearly that "inferiority" is the result of the
violent enactment of the laws of the state, suggests the range between
"inferiority" and "superiority" which is the result of the social and legal
subjugation of "black" Americans under "white" Americans. In Hume's
formulation, cause and effect are made invisible through his naturalization
of the results of subjugation into an understanding of "white" as superior,
and "negroe" as inferior. 6

)

6Hume goes on to explain how "In Jamaica, indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of
parts and learning [Francis Williams, the Cambridge-educated poet who wrote verse in
Latin]; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot,
who speaks a few words plainly" (Gates, 10). It is very interesting that Hume comes
round to saying that any achievements "negroes" may have are simple "parrotings" of the
achievements of their white "superiors." Although I won't be using him directly, Homi
Bhabha's theories of colonial mimicry very definitely "ghost" this paper. Perhaps most
important to my thinking has been his analysis of the never-closeable space between
mimed and mimic, self and other. English colonials in India had a "desire for a reformed,
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite.
Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in
order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its
difference" (126). This is related very importantly to Diana Fuss' understanding of the
function of the homosexual Other in the homo/hetero polarity, in which homosexuality
(analogous to but not the same as Bhabha's colonized mimic) "becomes the excluded; it
stands in for, paradoxically, that which stands without. But the binary structure of
sexual orientation, fundamentally a structure of exclusion and exteriorization,
nonetheless constructs that exclusion by prominently including the contaminated other
in its oppositional logic. The homo in relation to the hetero, much like the feminine in
relation to the masculine, operates as an indispensable interior exclusion -- an outside
which is inside interiority making the articulation of the latter possible, a
transgression of the border which is necessary to constitute the border as such" (Fuss,
3). The colonial and the colonized, the heterosexual and the homosexual, constitute
polarities in which the obsessive articulation of "what is different" binds the two poles
in an inextricable and incestuous relation in which mimicry plays an enormous role.
But the whole comic tragedy is that mimicry can never become same. The closer it gets
the more farcical the mimicry becomes, because to close the gap would be to destroy the
polarity, as I have suggested by contrasting Hume's and Jacob's understandings of the
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If spaces between are spectra of color and identity made invisible by

their constant rupture and elision into polarized understandings, then the
inability to see spaces between can be understood as a linguistically and legally
institutionalized blind spot. Just as the side-mirror in a car can erase a truck,
showing instead a stretch of smooth highway, so the antebellum
understanding of race served to erase the link which connects "black" to
"white." In this case, however, the blind spot is not that which can't be
physically seen with the eye, but the rift legal and linguistic polarizing
interdictions create in the smooth spectrum which the eye perceives.
"Miscegenation" or, according to the American Heritage Dictionary,
"The interbreeding of what are presumed to be distinct human races," was
one of the factors most unsettling to the constant maintenance of the blind
spot and the resulting repolarization of "race" in America. For example,
Karen Sanchez-Eppler describes the problem which miscegenation created for
the antebellum understanding of race, and the answer language provided:
"The less easily race can be read from his or her flesh, the more clearly the
white man's repeated penetrations of the black body are imprinted there. The
quadroon'S one-fourth blackness represents two generations of miscegenating
intercourse, the octoroon's three -- their numerical names attesting to
society's desire to keep track of an ever less visible black ancestry even at the
cost of counting the generations of institutionalized sexual exploitation" (40).

"inferiority" of the slave. Bhabha tells how. British colonials wanted n'a class of
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern -- a class of persons Indian
in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect' -- in
other words, a mimic man raised 'through our English school. .. to form a corps of
translators .. .' He [the mimic man] is the effect of a flawed colonial mimesis, in which
to be Anglicized is emphatically not to be English" (Bhabha, 128). A metaphor which
has helped me envision this is Xeno's paradox, which points out that because space is
infinitely divisible in half, then objects should never meet, because space can never be
fully spanned.
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"Numerical names" insured that a pale "black" body remain on the "black"
side of the racial dichotomy, thus making conceptually invisible the spectrum
of color.
The polarity of race was inscribed not only into language, but into law.
In the antebellum South, a law dating to a 1662 Virginia statute insured that
light skinned "blacks" would remain safely enslaved, providing that children
"got by an Englishman upon a Negro woman shall be bond or free according
to the condition of the mother" (Higgenbotham, 44). The question
miscegenation raised regarding race classification was thus answered, since
the vast majority of "mulattos" were the result of the rape of slave women by
white men.

After emancipation this answer was no longer possible, and

numerical laws were drafted, defining race based on fractions: "In 1879
Virginia defined a Negro as possessing one-fourth or more of Negro blood.
By 1910... the law was amended to include as Negroes all who had onesixteenth or more Negro blood... the law was amended -- in 1930 -- to read
that every person in whom there is 'ascertainable any Negro blood shall be
deemed and taken to be a colored person'" (Franklin, 34).7 Thus, the space
between racial polarities was made invisible through linguistic and legal
interdiction, resulting in a collective cultural blind spot which refused and
7Higgenbotham notes that these attitudes surrounding the fear of miscegenation and the
need to define race are not by any means antique, "for it was not until 1967 that the
United States Supreme Court finally declared unconstitutional those statutes prohibiting
interracial marriages. The Supreme Court waited thirteen years after its Brown
decision dealing with desegregation in schools before, in Loving v. Virginia, it agreed to
consider the issue of interracial marriages. Many commentators have suggested that the
issue of interracial marriage was far more explosive than even the maelstrom involved
over integrated education. .. In the celebrated Loving case the Virginia trial judge in
January, 1959 stated his legal rationale justifying the constitutionality of the
prohibition against interracial marriages as follows: 'Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and He placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with His arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.
The fact that He separated the races shows that He did not intend for the races to mix'"
(41-42).

Schneider, 8

still to a large extent refuses to see "race" and the often violent prejudice
which that metaphor "justifies" as an epistemological and social construction
which has been passed down from the institution of American and Caribbean
slavery.
But even if the polarity of race is produced and reproduced through
linguistic and legal interdictions, and even if spaces between are thereby made
unsayable and invisible, these very sites of interdiction are still the weakest
points in the logic of polarized understandings. Laws can reify the categorical
construction of race. Categorical language creates official definitions and
therefore ontologies of what can be conceptually seen by dominant "whites"
and actually lived by subjugated "blacks." But the polarity of these laws and
words suggest spaces between, which Harriet Jacobs, writing from the
categorized position of a black fugitive slave, can suggest. As I have already
shown, she uses one of the fundamental polarizing justifications for slavery,
"admit[ting] the black man is inferior." But rather than stopping there, she
asks the all-important question, "what is it that makes him so?", thus
deconstructing the polarity to show that this cornerstone justification of
slavery is a construction of the slave system itself.
The example I just cited is exceptionally straightforward. That the
slave system was brutalizing and dehumanizing was more palatable to a
white female abolitionist audience than the aspects of Jacobs' story which deal
with sexuality, miscegenation, and the resulting destabilization of
black/white as reliable identity categories. In these cases she cannot simply
make visible the spaces between and thus illuminate the blind spot, because
the white female audience for which she writes was grounded in official
ontologies which forbade explicit discussion of the sexual abuse resulting in
"miscegenation" and whose polarized understanding of race produced a blind
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spot to the conceptual instability potentially produced by that same
miscegenation. 8 Rather, Jacobs can only suggest non-polarized
understandings inter dicta,9 or in the slippage and ambiguity between the
words which, used categorically, function as the repolarizing interdictions she
must combat. In other words, Jacobs must both reproduce official language
and acceptable form, and use the ambiguity which language and form creates
to subvert polarities and suggest spaces between.
I use the word suggest as opposed to reveal because what cannot be
directly expressed remains invisible insofar as it has no official ontology. The
text does not reveal spectra of understanding because what is "seen" once one
realizes the importance of "looking" inter dicta, is not the "content" of spaces
between which have been made invisible by epistemological categories.
Rather it is the existence of the blind spot, the fact of one's inability to see
spectra, due to the polarized understandings and ontologies of American
culture, which is suggested. 10 The irony is that this is an act of looking which
is impossible. 11 How can a blind spot remain blind if one looks at it? One
8For a discussion of "the cult of true womanhood" as it affected and was affected by
"race," see footnote #25
9The interesting word play of interdiction and inter dicta is used by Bhabha to a different
end in "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," p. 30.
10The text does not disguise its "true" meaning under a cloak of "white women's"
language and literary form, cunningly leaving clues for the insightful reader to follow.
Rather I think a great deal of the text's power lies not outside, but in its ability to use
categorical language and form to suggest possible spectra between the polarized
understandings which governed antebellum America and which have governed America in
different ways ever since.
11 We tend, and this tendency resonates with the constant repolarization of race in
America, to think of the opposite of vision as "blackness" or "darkness." This is not the
case. Blindness has nothing to do with blackness. Blackness is an extreme on a spectrum
of color and light, a visual experience. When I was four I lost the sight in my right eye.
For a week my brain tried to process the information sent by one seeing and one blind
eye. But the messages my blinded eye sent were incomprehensible: "there is nothing -not brightness or darkness -- nothing." Blindness. Our language has no way to describe
the sensation of "seeing" nothing. For a week I refused to leave my mother's side. I
wouldn't let her go out of the house. Luckily for both of us my brain began to refuse the
blind eye's signals. I now only "see" with my left eye. Whatever it is my blind eye
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can only suggest it. Outline it. The possible function which the space
between has in this text, then, is located not within it, but in the act of trying
to look at it, trying to suggest it.
The importance and complicated ramifications of spaces between and
blind spots are realized spatially and physically, not just conceptually, in the
text. For seven years Jacobs sits hidden in her grandmother's attic crawlspace.
The attic lies between slavery and freedom in that while she hides there
Jacobs is no longer subject to her owner, Dr. Flint. But, in that the space is so
tiny that her limbs atrophy from disuse, she is also not free. As both a
stepping-stone to freedom and as a prison, the attic is a physical manifestation
of the space between the mutually exclusive conditions of slavery and
freedom. The space is invisible not because the shape of the attic can't be seen
from the street, but because it is so tiny that no one would ever think that a
woman could survive there. Jacobs can see out of the attic, and from that
position she can observe the operations of the slave community from a
vantage point which is neither within slavery nor outside of it.
That Jacobs' physical body inhabits a manifestation of the space
between is not surprising. American slavery was, in its economic purposes,
an institution of the body. The slave's body was commodified and worked,
in the field, the house, and in the reproduction of the slave population. The
reasons for the enslavement of black Africans by white Europeans and

)

experiences has been erased from my consciousness. Sometimes I close my seeing eye
and "look" at my blindness. But what I see is the dark inside of my seeing eye's eyelid.
There is nothing to the right -- neither brightness nor it's visual opposite, darkness -nothing. It is impossible for me to look at, and impossible for me to describe. The
metaphor of the blind spot does not match perfectly the physical blindness of an eye -the eye can be seen and cannot see, the blind spot cannot be seen, but can see. I have
included this footnote, therefore, not to strengthen the metaphor I've chosen, but to
attempt, and in attempting show its impossibility, to describe blindness itself.
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Americans are complicated and not reducible to an original antagonism of
white against black. Rather, the shift in European and African societies from
ancient and early medieval slave systems based on criteria other than race, to
the mass enslavement of Africans by Europeans and white Americans in the
modern world, gave rise to the construction of a polarized understanding of
black and white which served, and still serves, to justify the subjugation of
those bodies designated "black" by those designated "white."12 The racialized
"black" body13 became, thereby, the site of categorically controlling
definitions, from the overarching definition of "slave," to stereotypes and
constructions of racial characteristics whose implications reached, and reach,
far beyond the body, into the minds and thought-processes of both blacks and
whites.
Harriet Jacobs' body was defined and therefore treated as enslaved in a
culture where enslavement was supposedly based on mutually exclusive
racial characteristics whose unmistakable sign was "black" skin color as
opposed to its "opposite," "white" skin color. But Harriet Jacobs was a very
light skinned "black" woman. 14 She defines herself as a mulatto on the first

12The history of the development of modern racism is well documented. I learned about
it in 1989 in Stephen Volk's lecture class, "The History of The Caribbean."
13 As opposed to the white body which often is not culturally seen and does not see itself
as raced. Hazel Carby speaks beautifully to the need to recognize "race" as affecting
black and white, in an explanation of Reconstructing Womanhood which was fundamental
to my thinking about this paper: "This book works within the theoretical premises of
societies 'structured in dominance' by class, by race, and by gender and is a materialist
account of the cultural production of black women intellectuals within the social
relations that inscribed them. It delineates the sexual ideologies that defined the ways in
which white and black women 'lived' their relation to their material conditions of
existence... We need more feminist work that interrogates sexual ideologies for their
racial specificity and acknowledges whiteness, not just blackness, as a racial
categorization. Work that uses race as a central category does not necessarily need to be
about black women" (Carby, 17-18).
141 recently went up to an acquaintance in the Feve and asked her what was up. She said
she had to finish reading a book in time for a class, and to my surprise she pulled out a
much newer and less beat up'copy of the same edition of Incidents which I had in my bag.

Schneider, 12

page, and later in the book she's described by a "grim-looking [poor white]
f.

fellow" as "Dis 'ere yaller gal" (Jacobs, 65). Jacobs' skin, as a physical
manifestation of the mutability of race, stood for herself and for generations
of her readers "as a bodily challenge to the conventions of reading the body...
simultaneously insisting that the body is a sign of identity and undermining
the assurance with which that sign can be read," as Karen Sanchez-Eppler
puts it (Sanchez-Eppler, 41). In other words, Jacobs' body, in a slave culture
whose logic was threatened by the discrepancy between race as a immutable
polarity and the spectra of color perceivable on the faces and bodies of human
beings, suggests in itself a conceptual space between. It is, at the most basic
level, Jacobs' body which is made invisible by the blind spot. And it is that
invisible space from which the constructedness of race might be "seen,"
which the text asks the reader to look for at every turn. But, as I will show,
the space between racial dichotomies, which is made manifest on her body,
cannot be suggested by that body. It is when the body is textualized by Jacobs
herself that alternatives to "the [polarized] conventions of reading the body"
can be suggested.
Take, for example, the passage from Incidents which I have quoted as
an epigraph. The passage follows a forceful indictment (and I intend all the
resonances that word has accrued) of the hypocrisy of "Yankees" who, reviled
by Southern planters, still "consent to do the vilest work for them, such as the
ferocious bloodhounds and the despised negro-hunters are employed to do at
home." Because of the Fugitive Slave Law, this condemnation has very
broad scope: all the Northern states and their "law-abiding" citizens are
implicated. Jacobs' outlining of the complicity of Northerners with Southern
I said, "Wow, that's crazy -- I'm writing my thesis on that book." She said, "well then
you can tell me. Why did they put this photograph of a white woman on the cover?"

Schneider, 13
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slavery serves to destabilize the American polarity of North and South,15 and
to condemn Northerners as well as Southerners for the peculiar form of
racism outlined in the dramatic statement which follows: "They seem to
satisfy their consciences with the doctrine that God created the Africans to be
slaves. What a libel upon the heavenly Father, who 'made of one blood all
nations of men!'" Having established the contradiction between what
slaveholding "Christians" understood of God's will, and what God "actually"
intended, Jacobs follows the logic of "one blood" to the question, "And then
who are Africans?" This could mean, if all people are of one blood, what is
race? Does it exist? She then asks, "Who can measure the amount of AngloSaxon blood coursing in the veins of American slaves?"

Following right

behind her own question 'w hich seems to destabilize the existence of race at
all, Jacobs reiterates a dichotomized definition of race, creating a category of
"Anglo-Saxon blood." But she does this only to remind the reader that that
self-same and supposedly pure blood is "coursing," and, although she does
not remind the reader of this, coursing as the direct result of the
institutionalized rape of black women by white men, "in the veins of
American slaves." Jacobs thus outlines the contradiction between the polarity
of race as it is constructed and reinforced in America, and the spectrum of
color as it appears on people's bodies, due partly to what is called
miscegenation. But the truly subversive aspect of this little paragraph lies in
the word "who."16 We have a contradictory system, Jacobs explains. The
problem lies in the body and in the blood. Who, which body, can sort it out?

Who is going to point out, to make visible, "the amount of Anglo-Saxon

15This is not an unusual tactic in abolitionist literature. Frederick Douglass and
Harriet Beecher Stowe do the same thing.
16Thanks to Paige Sarlin for recognizing the potential of this word.
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blood coursing in the veins of American slaves" (Jacobs, 44)? Her question is
a rhetorical one, serving to bolster God's Word: no one can measure it,
because it is one blood. But the question also begs for the answer, "Harriet
Jacobs." For even in pointing out the contradiction between race as a
constructed polarity and race as physically mutable, she has established herself
as the revealer of racial injustice and misunderstanding. Also, and even
more importantly, Harriet Jacobs is herself an American slave whose veins
flow with Anglo-Saxon blood. She is, in her very own body, a measurement
of the amount. She stands, at the most basic and bodily level, between, in the
conceptual and ontological space made invisible by the polarized construction
of race.
As the sign and site of her identity, the racial invisibility of Jacobs' body
creates a ripple effect, problematizing other dichotomized constructions and
understandings out of which she writes. Of critical importance, because the
text is advertised as "truth," is the polarity of truth and falsehood. Written
for a white audience, Incidents must on the one hand present itself as "strictly
true," in order to "arouse the women of the North to a realizing sense of the
condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage" (Jacobs, 1).
On the other hand, as Jacobs' editor, Lydia Maria Child, indicates with a subtle
sarcasm, Jacobs' sexual experiences ''belong to a class which some call delicate
subjects, and others indelicate." Either way, the "wrongs [are] so foul, that our
[white women's] ears are too delicate to listen to them" (Jacobs, 4). Child
points to the ironic polarity of "delicacy" vs. "indelicacy." The two words
appear to be opposites, but in fact they achieve exactly the same goal. By
claiming that sexual abuse is either too delicate or too indelicate for white
women's ears, the need to discuss abuse is nullified. White rape of slave
women, which is the subject at hand, conveniently becomes invisible,
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unsayable, and thereby untrue. But rape, the reality of which is told by Jacobs'
light-skinned body, and the threat of which is used against that body, is one of
the truths which Jacobs has to tell. Jacobs' genealogy and her sexual history,
in other words, already place her between the constructed polarity of truth
and falsehood, even before she begins to write what she wishes to set forth as
truth.
How can Jacobs write truth from a place between white antebellum
society's construction of truth and falsehood? Hazel Carby, writing about the
difficulty black women had in representing their sexuality in antebellum
American, describes the problem perfectly: "narratives by black women
embody the tension between the author's desire to privilege her experience,
and being able to speak only within a discourse of conventionally held beliefs
about the nature of black womanhood" (Carby, 22).17 Carby locates the

)

tension between what needs to be said and what can be said. The author's
experiences can only be expressed in the language of conventional truth.
What occurs, therefore, is not a reverse-discourse,18 but an oscillation
between conceptual poles, much as a sailing ship makes use of prevailing
winds by tacking back and forth across the course it follows. I am not saying

17See footnote #25 for Carby's outline of the way in which black and white womanhoods
were defined over against one another, with black womanhood negatively defined at every
turn.
18Judith Butler outlines the difference between reverse-discourse and invisibility quite
nicely: "Here it becomes important to recognize that oppression works not merely
through acts of overt prohibition, but covertly, through the constitution of viable
subjects and through the corollary constitution of a domain of unviable (un)subjects -abjects, we might call them -- who are neither named nor prohibited within the
economy of the law... To be prohibited explicitly is to occupy a discursive site from
which something like reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be implicitly proscribed
is not even to qualify as an act of prohibition (Butler, 20). The
invisibility/inarticulation of the mulatta in ante-bellum literature and culture is
complicated in different ways than the invisibilitylinarticulation of the lesbian in
contemporary America, but I find this discussion nevertheless helpful in understanding
the invisibility and silence of spaces between.
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that Harriet Jacobs consciously delineated a space between in this manner. I
am saying that the ambiguities which many readers, of whom I will examine
three representative ones, have pointed out in the text serve to encompass
spaces between the controlling and defining polarities of race and truth.
This constant slippage and ambiguity raise questions of authority.19
From its writing to its present-day reception, readings of Incidents have been
obsessed with its authority, from the question of "is this story true," to "who
actually wrote it," to "to whom does the text speak" to "who owns it." The
persistence of this concern serves to point up the existence and continued
effect of the text's ability to slip out from under authoritarian categories. I
will examine three readings of the text, chosen for their historical and
representative positions as well as for their dramatic effect: an 1861 review,
John Blassingame's 1972 dismissal of the text as "fiction," and Joanne M.
Braxton's 1986 response, after the "authenticity" of Incidents was reestablished. If the subversive potential of the text lies in spaces between
which caml0t be seen or articulated, how can and should authority, in all its
19 Authority is an extremely complicated word, and I mean to use it as such. Gilbert and
Gubar quote Edward Said's discussion of the word in The Madwoman in The Attic:
"Authority suggests to me a constellation of linked meanings ... .'a power to enforce
obedience,' or 'a derived or delegated power,' or 'a power to inspire belief,' or 'a person
whose opinion is accepted' ....a person who originates or gives existence to something, a
begetter, beginner, father, or ancestor, a person also who sets forth written statements .
. . .an increaser and thus a fo·under. Auctoritas is production, invention, cause, in
addition to meaning a right of posseSSion. Finally, it means continuance, or a causing to
continue. Taken together these meanings are all grounded in the following notions: (1)
that of the power of an individual to initiate, institute, establish -- in short, to begin;
(2) that this power and its product are an increase over what had been there previously;
(3) that the individual wielding this power controls its issue and what is derived
therefrom; (4) that authority maintains the continuity of its course" (Gilbert and
Gubar, 4). Gilbert and Gubar discuss very helpfully how these definitions do not work
for and in fact work against [white] women authors. If we recognize that the four
concepts Said identifies are grounded are precisely those notions, or rights, which are
legally denied the slave, in particular the slave mother whose children [and perhaps by
extension, whose "narratives"] are not hers to "author," then the word potentially has
different and very specifically harmful dysfunctions in the Afro-American woman
author's experience, especially the woman slave narrator.
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meanings, be granted and/or claimed by the text? The construction of race
has the authority of an interdiction: one is either black or white. Equally, our
understanding of veracity has the authority of an interdiction: something is
either true or it is false. But if a text functions between polarities, if it
resonates "inter dicta," or between the lines, what happens to race? To
veracity? To authority?20 Readers have, at different times, offered different
and often contradictory answers to these questions .

.. .. ..
Harriet Jacobs' body functions at a base level to suggest the space
between. In its appearance, her body denies the "logic" of the polarization of
race. Harriet Jacobs' darker-than-"white" skin, or more appropriately, her
Mrican ancestry, designates her a slave. Her lighter-than-"black" skin, which
reveals her .~uropean ancestry, serves as living proof of the existence of
miscegenation and therefore of the possibility of the passage across
generations between supposedly "opposite" races. Because she was a woman,
Jacobs' body had the very specific function within the slave economy of
producing more slaves. Thus, both as the site of past miscegenations, and as
the potential producer of more in-between bodies, Jacobs' female, lightskinned body can be seen to function as a fundamental threat to the

20Homi Bhabha has very strongly influenced me in my thinking about the importance of
authority in a text like this. He writes: "The visibility of mimicry is always produced
at the site of interdiction. It is a form of colonial discourse at the crossroads of what is
known and permissible and that which though known must be kept concealed; a discourse
uttered between the lines and as such both against the rules and within them. The
question of representation of difference is therefore always also a problem of authority"
(Bhabha, 126).
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dichotomized construction of race on which the justifications for slavery
were built.
There is, however, a discrepancy between the body's experience as
enslaved, and the constructedness of race which that body's light skin helps to
reveal. The spectrum which Jacobs' body advertised, while it may have
affected the way in she was treated, possibly making her more of a sexual
commodity in the eyes of her white master, did not affect the fact that she
lived as a slave and her body was used as such.
Jacobs recognizes the ironies of the discrepancy between the spectrum
of color as it appears before the eyes and the polarity of race as it was enforced
in antebellum America. Describing her Uncle Benjamin's escape, she writes,
"For once his white face did him a kindly service. They had no suspicion that
it belonged to a slave; otherwise the law would have been followed out to the
letter, and the thing rendered back to slavery" (24). She describes her uncle's
"passing" as a bitter joke on whites who believe that they can read race but
instead are

"s~aves"

to the polarized understanding of race.

Also in reference

to her uncle she makes a veiled commentary on her own position as a lightskinned slave woman. Describing Benjamin after his months in jail, she
writes, "Long confinement had made his face too pare; his form too thin."
But a slave-trader, seeing Benjamin in that state, "said he would give any
price if the handsome lad was a girl. We thanked God that he was not" (23).
Jacobs does not, in discussing the sexual desire of either her master, Dr. Flint,
or her white lover, Mr. Sands, make reference to her

s~

color, but the anger

she feels is quite clear in this reference to her uncle, in which his paleness is
made unnatural by confinement, and then sexualized in that heightened state
by the slaveholder's gender-bending gaze. "We thanked God he was not [a
girl]," because while whiteness, according to the polarized construction of
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race, is a sign of freedom, and for women bearing that sign, of purity and true
womanhood, one of the many fallacies in the construction of race is that the
"whiter" the "black" woman the more sexually desirable and therefore
valuable she is to white men. 21 The body of Harriet Jacobs, therefore, is a
very complicated "thing." It defines her as a slave, is commodified by
slavery, and, in its light skin, both delineates a space between black and white
which undermines that construction and serves, sexually, to commodify her
still further.
In her lived experience, then, Jacobs' light-skinned body does nothing
to assuage her situation as a slave.22 But there is a radical difference between
Jacobs' lived experience as a slave defining, defined by and occupying her
body, and her very carefully constructed text designed for a white audience
which, albeit abolitionist, was as saturated with the polarized construction of
)

race as those who lived south of the Mason-Dixon line. Writing about
conventions of reading in antebellum America, Karen Sanchez-Eppler
describes how ·~'the bodies of women and slaves were read against them ... for
21 James Norcom, the real name of Dr. Flint, ran an advertisement in the American
Beacon of July 4, 1835, for the capture of Harriet Jacobs. He described her thus: "She
is a light mulatto, 21 years of age, about 5 feet 4 inches high, of a thick and corpulent
habit, having on her head a thick covering of black hair that curls naturally, but which
can be easily combed straight" (Incidents, 215). A description of Jacobs' body is of
utmost importance to a potential slave-catcher. Jacobs' body is of utmost importance to
Norcom who, according to Jacobs, desires her both as property and sexually. Ironically,
contained within his description of that body is the acknowledgement of its racial
ambiguity. That ambiguity, however, is a blind-spot, looked at but not seen. On a
personal and entirely subjective note, this description made my skin crawl, because,
having read Jacobs, I could smell in Norcom's description of the body he considered his,
and in his assertion that "this girl absconded from the plantation of my son without any
known cause of provocation," the utter complacency and assurance of someone who
thinks, knows he's right. Someone for whom rape and torture are as common and
unremarkable as a plate of eggs.
22"Passing," in fact, is an answer to the problem of race relations which she finds at
best grimly amusing, as with her uncle's experience, at worst, despicable: "I knew this
colored man had spent many nights hunting for me. Every body knew he had the blood of
a slave father in his veins; but for the sake of passing himself off for white, he was
ready to kiss the slaveholder's feet. How I despised him" '{119)1
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both the human body was seen to function as the foundation not only of a
general subjection but also of a specific exclusion from political discourse"
(30). But when Jacobs moves from a situation in which her body represents
her to one in which she is representing her own body in writing, she is able to
engage in a "political discourse." Sanchez-Eppler explains how "For women
and slaves the ability to speak was predicated upon the reinterpretation of
their flesh ... Transformed from a silent site of oppression into a symbol of
that oppression, the body becomes within both feminist and abolitionist
discourses a means of gaining rhetorical force" (30). The difference thus lies
in how Jacobs' body is misused as a living, breathing organism, and the
rhetorical potential which that body's representation has, through Jacobs'
own inscription of its experiences into text. The hypocrisy of the slave
system may have been manifest on her body, but her body still lived as a slave
to that hypocrisy. It is in -her text, where she represents bodies using the very
words which name bodies, that she is able to suggest the space between.
How does she do this? Of utmost importance is the fact that she cannot
use words at their face value, for it is her own "face's value" which words
define. When she begins to represent her face and body in text, she can
accentuate the gaps occasioned by the slippages arid the ambiguities of the play
of words to suggest spaces between institutionalized polarities of thought and
understanding. For example, after describing the brutal wave of white
terrorism which followed Nat Turner's 1831 rebellion, Jacobs writes that "No
two people that had the slightest tinge of color in their faces dared to be seen
walking together" ijacobs,64). This sentence is divided between the sarcastic
tone in which Jacobs writes "the slightest tinge of color" and the ominous
warning that such people "dared [not] be seen walking together." She thus
points out 1:>oth the mutability of race, and the bloody way in which "the
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slightest tinge of color" was forced to the persecuted "bfack" side of the racial
polarity. The irony is that "the slightest tinge of color/' a phrase which she so
beautifully uses in the text to invoke the spectrum which unites and
therefore conceptually negates the polarity of race, could not, as an actual
physical manifestation outside the text, invoke that spectrum, and in fact
invoked racist violence. The polarized construction of race is lived by the
bodies of all slaves, regardless of their color,23 but textuality allows Jacobs to
reconstruct bodies for her readership, and in doing so, to show how race is
constructed and reified by the slave system.

\

231n her chapter "Fear of Insurrection" Jacobs explores the ironies of the construction
of race by flipping the characteristics which "black" and "white" are expected to signify
through a description of the expectations which poor whites had of blacks. In her
description of poor whites Jacobs demonstrates that the low levels of intelligence and
social grace assumed to accrue to "black" skin are not reflections of "race" at all, but of
class. The chapter is an account of the wave of white terrorism which followed Nat
Turner's rebellion in 1831. "Low [poor] whites" (Jacobs, 63) are described as looting
and terrorizing the slave and free black population. When the poor whites are actually
in Jacobs' grandmother's house and going through her possessions, they come across
bedding and table cloths. "Where'd the damned niggers git all dis sheet an' table clarf?
.. White folks oughter have 'em all" (Jacobs, 65). This passage is striking because by
using dialect to make the poor whites appear far less cultured than her slave family,
Jacobs disrupts convention; the whites, rather than the blacks, are represented as
linguistically ignorant, an important strategy if the power of language as interdiction is
remembered. The passage is also important because the speakers' surprise reveals the
distance between tne expectations of what ~black" and "wh.te" mean in terms of material
comfort, and the possible realities. The speaker makes two distinctions in his speech,
between "niggers" and "white folks," and between people with sheets and people without.
In his mind, these two polarities ought to have a logical relationship to one another. But,
as Jacobs suggests, the two poles are only related in so far as that relationship is
brutally enforced. This distinction is also made early in this chapter in one of Jacobs'
most incisive and straight-forward condemnations of the slave system. She writes of the
"low whites" brutality: "They exulted in such a chance to exercise a little brief
authority, and show their subserviency to the slaveholders; not reflecting that the
power which trampled on the colored people also kept themselves in poverty, ignorance,
and moral degradation" (Jacobs, 64). Jacobs could easily have garnered "sympathy" for
her cause had she portrayed the brutality of the poor whites as purely a function of their
race. But by naming the common denominator of oppreSSion as "power" rather than
"race," Jacobs subtilely deconstructs race itself, suggesting instead that poor whites and
enslaved blacks have a common enemy in the planter class ..
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The textualization of the body is also important due to antebellum
implications of the act of writing. As Henry Louis Gates, Jr. discusses in his
introduction to "Race," Writing, and Difference, the ability to write was seen
by white Europeans and Americans as synonymous wi,th the ability to reason.
Mricans were considered inferior because, according to white writers, "they
had developed no systems of writing and had not mastered the art of writing
in European languages" (Gates, 11). This philosophical belief was, of course,
bolstered not by a "natural" scale of intelligence based on "race," but by the
laws of slave holding nations, which made illegal slave literacy. Thus the use
of the written word, and therefore the representation of slaves and free blacks
through the written word, became the legally enforced exclusive terrain of
white writers. But, as Gates points out, "Black people responded to these
profoundly serious allegations about their 'nature' as directly as they could:
they wrote books, poetry, autobiographical narratives" (Gates, 11). But, as
antebellum black writers addressing white audiences found, using the
language and forms which many white writers used to represent and define
blacks negatively was extremely restricting. Much subversive content was
forced inter dicta, or between words, between lines, between rules. To look
one last time at her description of her uncle, Jacobs clearly understands the
potentially negative power of language. "The letter of the law," in naming a
"black" man a "thing," serves to constantly reify

th~

race. But if words and names are thus interdicted

polarized construction of

aga~st

the body, Jacobs uses

that same language in a way that she cannot use her body: "For once his
white face did him a kindly service." The bitter phrase "for once" implies
that a "white face," while supposedly situating one on the "free" side of the
polarity, is in fact a sign which doesn't help the slave, whose slave status is
based metaphorically on skin color but legally on '''the condition of the
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mother." The next phrase, "They had no suspicion that it [his face] belonged
to a slave," condemns the understanding of race which sees "white" as free
and "black" as enslaved, and which upholds a contradictory system whereby
Benjamin's white face is named "black" and therefore slave. The status of

slave in these two sentences is revealed to have no founding in a biological
racial duality. Rather, the interdictions of law and the legalized categorical
language of "race" construct the slave system: "Otherwise, the law would
have been carried out to the letter, and the thing rendered back to slavery."
Thus Jacobs leads us from Benjamin's "white face" which, according to the
skewed logic of the polarized construction of race, should make him a free

man, to the legality of slavery which sees the children of slave mothers as
things, regardless of color. Law and the power of categorical language become

)

the target of Jacobs'

deco~tructive

capacities. AI' she indicates using the

common phrase, "the letter of the law," law is composed of words, and words
are composed of letters. The law, its constructedness revealed, is as perverse
as the polarized understanding of race which naturalizes law. One could say
that Harriet Jacobs carries the law out to the letter in that she tears its
language, its letters, apart to reveal the tragically absurd power of categories
which allow a human being to be defined as a thing. 24 Thus, by using the
language which, as Gates has shown, often negatively defined her body, Jacobs
can suggest the constructedness and the logic of the legally and linguistically
interdicted system which enslaves her body.
These sentence to sentence suggestions of spaces between extend to
'.,

Jacobs' use of genre and the conventions of sentimentality, and the way in
24The title of her chapter on her uncle, "The Slave Who Dared to Feel Like a Man," uses
the constructed polarity of the words "slave" and "man," one of the fundamental
justifications for slavery being that black men are not, in fact, men but a lower form of
life, to suggest by simply showcasing the polarity, the space between those poles.
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which she positions herself as author. As a text

~ttempting

to communicate

the horror of the, American slave system to a white female audience deeply
initiated into the cult of true womanhood, Incidents must negotiate tricky
territory regarding issues of sex and race relations. 25 The first sentence of
Jacobs' preface says a great deal about how her body as reconstructed in the
text and her role as the author of that text, functioned as intermediaries
between the poles of black and white as they were understood in antebellum
America. "Reader, be assured this narrative is no fiction" (Jacobs, 1). This
famous sentence contains within it the complex and often contradictory
system of constructed identities and assumptions which Jacobs, as a "black"
female fugitive slave writing for a "white" female abolitionist audience, had
to negotiate.

25Hazel Carby provides a stunning analyses of the cult of true womanhood and the effect
it had on white i;lnd black understanding of black female sexuality: "The dominating
ideology to define the boundaries of acceptable female behavior from the 1820s until the
Civil War was the 'cult of true womanhood.' Barbara Welter, a feminist historian, has
characterized its basic tenets: 'the attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman
judged herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society, could be
divided into four cardinal virtues -- piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity. . . .
With them she was promised happiness and power.' ... The parameters of the ideological
discourse of true womanhood were bound by a shared social understanding that external
physical appearance reflected internal qualities of character and therefore provided an
easily discernible indicator of the function of a female of lhe human species. . .. While
fragility was valorized as the ideal sate of woman, heavy labor required other physical
attributes. Strength and ability to bear fatigue, argued to be so distasteful a presence in
a white woman, were positive features to be emphasized in the promotion and selling of a
black female field hand a slave auction. " .To:qualify as a "true woman." the possession
of virtue was an imperative. . .. Overt sexuality, on the other hand, emerged in the
images of the bthck woman, where 'charm' revealed its relation to the dark forces of evil
and magic. . .. Thus, the white slave master was not regarded as being responsible for
his actions toward his black female slaves. On the contrary, it was the female slave who
was held responsible for being a potential, and direct, t~reat tho the conjugal sanctity of
the white mistress. . .. Any historical investigation of the ideological boundaries of the
cult of true womanhood is a sterile field without a recognition of the dialectical
relationship with the alternative sexual code associated wit~ the black woman. Existing
outside the definition of true womanhood, black female sexuality was nevertheless used
to define what those boundaries were. The contradictions at a material and ideological
level can clearly be seen in the dichotomy between repressed and overt representations
of sexuality" (Carby, 23-30).
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That Jacobs chooses to call her book a "narrative" is significant, since

Incidents is not a slave "narrative" in the traditional sense. The most famous
and influential narratives were written by fugitive slaves themselves, but the
majority of slave narratives and interviews with fugitive slaves were
"narrated" to a white abolitionist scribe, who functioned as a mediating and
authenticating buffer between the story of the slave and the white audience
which was to hear it. 26 Jean Fagan Yellin, in her analysis of anti-slavery
emblems, Women and Sisters, explicates the function of this mediating and
authenticating presence. A popular anti-slavery emblem was that of the slave
woman bound in chains, kneeling before the white female figure of Liberty or
Justice. "With the inclusion of an empowered white chain-breaking liberator,
the enchained black supplicants are seen as powerless. The appearance of the
chain-breaker between shive and slaveholder makes it unnecessary for the
slaves to rise and break their own chains." In other words, the presence of the
"liberator" takes away any agency the slave may have, thereby making the
slave safe to both abolitionist and slaveholding whites. The white liberator
functions as a benevolent and helpful presence to the kneeling black woman,
whose potential power her benevolence negates. Her benevolence promises a

26Narratives written by fugitive slaves have survived the abolitionist era as literature
interesting for other reasons. As literature directed to a white abolitionist audience,
however, the slave narrative written by the fugitive him or herself was one of many
forms, now almost completely obscure, most of which were written by white writers for
white readers. From articles in The National Antislavery Standard, to short stories
published in annual women's publication, The Liberty Bell, the vast majority, or the
pulp, if you will, of abolitionist literature, was written by whites for whites. Although
self-written narratives such as Jacobs' and Douglass' attracted ~nd continue to attract
far more attention than the proliferation of white abolitiqnist propaganda, the white
audience which originally received Jacobs' text was indoctrinated by that white
abolitionist propaganda. For more information on the way this white on white literature
represented and used the "subject" of the black slave, see Sanchez-Eppler, Yellin, and
Grimm.
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smooth transition from slavery to "freedom," as long as freedom does not
mean "equality," but continues black dependance on white benevolence.
In 1837 the First Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women gave a
formal endorsement to the use of such emblems, hoping "that the speechless
agony of the fettered slave may unceasingly appeal to the heart of the patriot,
the philanthropist and the christian [sic]" (Yellin,5). Yellin wonders, "did the
freeborn white abolitionist feminists see their task as speaking for the
'voiceless'slave? Did they see it as enabling the slave to sound her own
voice on the platform and in print?" (Yellin, 25) One answer lies in the fact
that a figure similar to white-skinned Justice, a benevolent white abolitionist
scribe, was necessary to mediate not between the slave narrator and the slaveholding South, but between the narrator and her "sympathetic" audience of
northern white women. The "speechless agony," in other words, was not
speechless -- fugitive slaves were ready and willing to tell their stories. But
these stories as they were presented in the genre of the slave narrative were
highly edited And molded for white consumption.
Although the white abolitionist Lydia Maria Child had a hand in
editing Incidents, and although it is framed by Child's "authenticating"
preface and (surprisingly, because he was black)

Geo~ge

W. Lowther's

postscript, Harriet Jacobs' Incidents in the Life of A Slave Girl is, as the title
emphatically declares, Written By Herself. Who then, is the "narrative"
narrated to? Who is the intermediary, the authenticator? Who makes this
story safe? The answer is simple, and of utmost importance: the narrative,
which begins "reader," is narrated directly to that reader. The interlocutor27
27The American Heritage Dictionary offers as a secondary meaning of "interlocutor" this
highly fascinating definition: "The performer in a minstrel show who is placed midway
between the end men and engages in banter with them." This resonates with this thesis
because of between of the interlocutor's position between two constructed racial
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becomes both Jacobs herself, in so far as she directly relates the story via the
text, and the white reader, in so far as she reads that text. The responsibility
for making the text palatable, and for drawing attention to blind spots, is
placed directly on Jacobs and her readership.
With Jacobs as her own mediator, the issue of veracity becomes
extremely important. Just as slaves' testimony had no authority in a court of
law,28 so Jacobs' testimony as a fugitive slave amounts to that of a nonauthority. As those of a black woman, Jacobs' experiences can, according to
prevailing conventions, only be authenticated for white readers by the "good
word" of a white friend, yet that word is present only in a short preface to a
volume "written by herself." In her first sentence, therefore, Jacobs reflects
the bind she is in. "Reader, be assured this narrative [which, in the sense that
it is not narrated to a white mediator, is no narrative] is no fiction." Her story

)

cannot be authenticated without the white intermediary voice, but it will not
be her story if it is authenticated by that voice. The mediating presence of a
white "liberator" creates a "speechless agony" in the black slave's ability to
communicate her experience, not because she is naturally unable to express
herself, but because the benevolence of the liberating figure creates in the
liberator's mind a definition of the slave as silent sufferer. Since black
women were denied the right to speak at all in prQper discourse, "narratives

identities will be central to this paper. The very phenomenon of minstrel shows,
theatrical presentations in which white men wore black-face and acted out their
constructions of black-identity, is an extremely interesting in relation to this thesis .
The politics of white actors donning black face in order to both denigrate (another
fascinating and disturbingly germane etymology: from the Latin denigrare, or, to
blacken) and appropriate "black" identity is very interesting, as is the fact that as the
form developed, black actors who wished to perform for a white audience found it
necessary to wear black-face as well -- in other words, black actors had to don a
stereotyped/constructed black identity, and it was only from behind that "mask that
grins and lies" that they could criticize the construction itself. ******SOURCE
28S ee Higgenbotham, p. 124
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by [them] embody the tension between the author's desire to privilege her
experience and her ability to speak only within a discourse of conventionally
held beliefs about the nature of black womanhood" (Carby, 22). It is this
tension, operative throughout Incidents, which has troubled so many readers.
Not looking between the poles of truth/falsehood, readers such as John
Blassingame have felt that if Jacobs is restricted in how she tells her story by
the form in which she must tell it, if, in other words she cannot "tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," then her story must be
false. Readers such as Alice A. Deck, believing Jacobs' narrative to be
"authentic", nevertheless feel that the authenticity of Jacobs' black female
slave experience lies somewhere beneath the falsifying trappings of the
story.29 I would suggest that a more fruitful question than "is this story true,
" or "how is Jacobs oppressed by the genres she of necessity employs," is "how
is Jacobs using the forms she has available?"
Having tackled and claimed "narrative" for herself, Jacobs continues in
her first sentence to tackle and undermine the conventions of sentimentality
even as she adopts the sentimental form.

While it functions as a claim to

veracity, it is extremely important that Jacobs chose to specifically term her
narrative "no fiction."

Fiction, as it was employed by white abolitionists, was

a form which Jacobs needed, as a black woman writing about her sexual
experience, to distance herself from. In the novels and stories written by
white female abolitionists for a white female abolitionist audience,30 slave
bodies and experiences were written and read in such a way as to silence and
29 1 will not be using Deck's article when analyzing the book's reception, but I found it
exemplary of a certain kind of reading. See Alice A. Deck, "Whose Book is This?:
Authorial Versus (sic) Editorial Control of Harriet Jacobs' Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl: Written By Herself."
30For examples of and critical work on these novels and stories, see Karen SanchezEppler's "Bodily Bonds: The Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition."
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appropriate those bodies and experiences for white consumption. Rather
than textualizing the light-skinned "black" body in order to destabilize the
polarization of race, these antebellum writers used the "mulatta" to buttress
that polarization.
According to the conventions of sentimentality, "the self is externally
displayed and the body provides a reliable sign of who one is" (SanchezEppler,36). White abolitionist sentimental writers were therefore confronted
with the problem of how, when white is good and black is bad, when white is
beautiful and black is ugly, to "depict a black body that can be instantly
recognized ... as a hero or a heroine" (Sanchez-Eppler, 37). Many solved this
problem by writing tales of the tragic mulatta, a "black" woman with very
light skin. At first glance this move may appear a questioning of the
polarized construction of race through acknowledgement of the mutability of
race. In fact, the white abolitionists' fictional mulatta preserved racial
boundaries. She was a heroine who, because of her "whiteness," could be
sympathized with but who also, because of her "blackness," could and must
fall sexually. Sanchez-Eppler suggests that this pattern "demonstrates the
usefulness of the slave woman for the white woman's sexuality, and
particularly the usefulness of the mulatta, who in being part white and part
black. .. simultaneously embodies self and other" (42). The white reader
could vicariously experience sexuality through reading the body of the
fictional mulatta under the guise of antislavery "sentiment." The fictional
mulatta, in her story of virtue soiled, embodied what for a true (white)
woman was unacknowledgeable: the space between virtue and sexual
depravity, which involves desire and the reality of sexual abuse.
But because the "white" body of the fictional mulatta is really "black,"
the white reader need never allow the titillating glimpse of that space
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between to impinge upon her true womanhood. The white reader can
sympathetically follow the fictional mulatta into the forbidden realm of
sexual desire and sexual abuse, but, at the point at which the fictional mulatta
inevitably "falls," the white reader can re-polarize her understanding of race - color the mulatta "black" and herself "white" -- and maintain her adherence
to true womanhood. The figure of the fictional mulatta, therefore, while her
situation between the races is acknowledged and used in abolitionist fiction, is
not an indicator of a space between the poles of black and white. As SanchezEppler points out, the body of the fictional mulatta "embodies self and
other," or, in other words, maintains the dichotomy of race rather than
unsettling it. The body is self in so far as it is "white" and strives toward
virtue, other in so far as it is "black" and must therefore fall.
Once fallen, the tragic mulatta must, of course, die. The well-rehearsed

)

misogyny inherent in the ever-repeated death of fallen (white) women is
quite evident here. But Sanchez-Eppler sees another, equally disturbing trend
in the fact that "the freedom offered by antislavery fiction regularly depends
upon killing off black bodies, defining death as a glorious emancipation from
plantation slavery" (51). The obliteration of darkness from the bodies of black
heroines in order to make white readers sympathetic while still maintaining
"blackness" in order to keep that sympathy at a safe distance, and the
achievement of freedom through death, which, while envisioning freedom
for slaves, also envisions the destruction of black bodies, make sentimental
abolitionist fiction a dangerous genre for Harriet Jacobs to adopt.
Jacobs addresses and rejects the vision of freedom which calls for the
death of the black body. Although she couches her rejection by professing
love for Miss Fanny, the old white woman who wishes a sentimental death
on her, Jacobs clearly takes her to task for her condescending and morbid wish
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"that I and all my grandmother's family were at rest in our graves, for not
tmtil then should she feel any peace about us" (Jacobs, 89). Jacobs acerbically
comments that "The good old soul did not dream that I was planning to
bestow peace upon her, with regard to myself and my children; not by death,
but by securing our freedom" (Jacobs, 89). Since Miss Fanny pointedly does
not desire Jacobs' freedom, one suspects that not only would she rather see
Jacobs dead than tormented by Dr. Flint, she would also rather see her dead
than free. This hint, along with Jacobs' sarcastic reference to how she intends
to "bestow peace upon her," acknowledges and dismisses as offensive the
perversely romantic and violent notion of emancipation through death.
By claiming that her "narrative is no fiction," Jacobs suggests in her
very first sentence that her text should not be seen in the light of abolitionist
fiction. This mulatta character will not fulfill the sexualized self/other
polarity for white women's vicarious enjoyment. Nor will she take part in
the killing of black bodies, her own or anyone else's. To this end, Jacobs uses
the convention of sentimentality just as she uses words and sentences. Even
as she adopts the genre of the sentimental novel, she refuses to use and in fact
works to destroy the conventions of sentimentality and the destructive
representations of black bodies which the figure of the fictional mulatta and
the death of the black body in abolitionist fiction mandate. Those sites of
sentimental interdiction become and are maintained in Jacobs' text as sites of
inter diction, where Jacobs, through suggesting its constructedness, refuses to
capitulate to the polarized tmderstanding of race~
The power of Incidents' spaces between lies not in any utopian
realization of or even in a desire for the realization of a non-polarized
understanding of race. Rather, its power lies in its constant potential to
suggest blind spots in the readers' racial understandings, spots which, because
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they are unrecognized, serve to naturalize and buttress racist ideologies. This
unwavering suggestive power is carried out to and reinforced by the end of
the narrative. 31

Incidents, in my reading, ends both powerfully, and, in its

vision of "freedom" and American race relations, without placation or
resolution.
In the second-to-last paragraph, Jacobs writes two "logical" last
sentences to her narrative. "Reader," she writes, mirroring her first sentence,
"my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage. I and my
children are now free!" Q"acobs, 201). This, like the opening sentence, is a
complicated refusal of both the slave narrative form, and the conventions of
sentimentality. Seen as a slave narrative, the story does end in the usual way.
The arrival at the North, often presented as synonymous with freedom, is the
goal and end of many slave narratives. By claiming that freedom is an
\

unusual ending for her story, and that the usual ending would be marriage,
Jacobs aligns herself more strongly with the sentimental tradition, a move
which may be intended to strengthen a sense of similarity between herself
and her white readership. But she only alludes to Incidents' sentimental
leanings in order to refute them; the story does not end in marriage, and, as
the sentence is constructed, marriage is made distinctly separate from
freedom. The text thus slides out from under both the slave narrative genre
and the conventions of sentimentality. The reader, used to mediated
endings, is left as her own interlocutor, with Jacobs' "freedom" unmediated

31 Nellie McKay, in her 1987 article, "Reflections on Black Women Writers: Revising
the Literary Canon," claims that at the close of Incidents, Jacobs "tell us of her success
in finding employment after her escape, and of the happy union she had with her children
in the North" (McKay, 253). This simplification of the text down to its "happy ending"
plot elements is, I think, a prime example of a reader not "looking" inter dicta. Thus the
ending can be, and it has been, read as placidly and benignly "happy."
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by convention. To this extent, Jacobs frees herself from categorical
conventions as well as from slavery.
But Incidents does not end on this

note~

If Jacobs refuses to cushion

"freedom" in well-recited literary tradition, she also doesn't allow "freedom"
to cushion the end of her story. "Freedom" is a metaphor, like "race." Like
"race," however, it is a metaphor which, because of legal and linguistic
interdictions, has great effects on lived experience. Jacobs continues, "We are
as free from the power of slaveholders as are the white people of the north;
and though that, according to my ideas, is not saying a great deal, it is a vast
improvement in my condition" Qacobs, 201). "Freedom" is contextualized to
mean "freedom from the _power of slaveholders." While it is an enormous
and wonderful achievement, her "freedom" means only that Jacobs is no
longer legally owned by Dr. Flint. Jacobs does not extend "freedom" any
further than that specific legal interdiction which she has overcome.
Early in the text, Jacobs defines white women's freedom by their ability
to take care of their children without interference. At the end Jacobs points
out that this sort of freedom is exactly what she has not achieved: "The
dream of my life is not yet realized. I do not sit with my children in a home
of my own. I still long for a hearthstone of my own, however humble. I wish
it for my children's sake far more than for my own" Qacobs, 201). On page
sixteen, Jacobs specifically draws attention to the difference between free
mothers and slave

mothe~s.

Addressing "you happy free women" directly,

Jacobs writes, "Children bring their little offerings, and raise their rosy lips for
a caress. They are your own, and no hand but that of death can take them
from you" Qacobs, 16). On the day before the New Year's auction, however,
the slave mother "sits on her cold cabin floor, watching the children who
may all be tom from her the next morning; and often does she wish that she
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and they might die before the day dawns. She may be an ignorant creature,
degraded by the system that has brutalized her from childhood; but she has a
mother's instincts, and is capable of feeling a mother's agonies" (Jacobs, 16).
This absolute distinction between slave women's and free white women's
experience haunts even the end of her story. The "brutalizing system" which
creates the dichotomy between white and slave motherhood is not directly
recalled at the book's close, but it is suggested by the continued textual
insistence on the complicity of the North with Southern slavery, coupled
with Jacobs' refusal to equate the North with an ideal of "freedom."
The second to last paragraph ends when, as feminist critic Nellie
McKay interprets it, Jacobs "tell[s] us of her success in finding employment
after her escape" (McKay, 253). I think the end of this paragraph in fact creates
a suggestive inconsistency in her representation of "freedom." Mter her
indictment of Northern "freedom" Jacobs writes: "But God so orders
circumstances as to keep me with my friend [and employer], Mrs. Bruce.
Love, duty, gratitude, also bind me to her side. It is a privilege to serve her
who pities my oppressed people, and who has bestowed the inestimable boon
of freedom on me and my children" (Jacobs, 201). Mrs. Bruce "bestowed"
freedom on Jacobs by buying her from Dr. Flint's inheritors. When Mrs.
Bruce tells Jacobs of her intention to buy her, Jacobs says that "The more my
mind had become enlightened the more difficult it was for me to consider
myself an article of property. . .. I wrote to Mrs. Bruce, thanking her, but
saying that being sold from one owner to another seemed too much like
slavery; that such a great obligation could not be easily cancelled; and that I
preferred to go to my brother in California" (Jacobs, 199). Jacobs clearly states
that her personal integritY and her own understanding of what freedom
means will not bear the sale of her body, and she specifically asks that the end,
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her "freedom," not be made to justify the means by which it is achieved.
However, "By the next mail I received this brief letter from Mrs. Bruce: 'I am
rejoiced to tell you that the money for your freedom has been paid to Mr.
Dodge Uacobs' new owner]. Come home to-morrow. I long to see you and
my sweet babe" (Jacobs, 199-200). The devastating irony that Jacobs'
"freedom" was procured for her against her will through the sale of her own
body is made very clear in her telling of the story. I also do not think it is an
accident that she quotes Mrs. Bruce's exact words: "The money for your
freedom has been paid.... Come

ho~e

to-morrow." This "freedom" has

strings attached, strings which allow Mrs. Bruce to authoritatively say "come
home [back to work] to-morrow," even when Jacobs has stated her intention
to make her home with her brother in California. Just as Jacobs feared, "such
a great obligation Uacobs' responsibility to Child for her purchase] could not be
easily cancelled" (Jacobs, 199). This means by which Jacobs' freedom was
obtained, and her vehement reaction to it,32 seem incongruous with her
humble expressions of gratitude a few paragraphs later. 33 Having made it
32Jacobs' reaction to Mrs. Bruce's letter is, for me, one of the strongest pieces of
writing in the book, both for its expository effect, and for its direct address to future
readers, not only of the bill of sale itself, but of the Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl:
"My brain reeled as I read these lines. A gentleman near me said, 'It's true; I have seen
the bill of sale.' 'The bill of sale I' Those words struck me like a blow. So I was sold at
lastl A human being sold in the free city of New Yorkl The bill of sale is on record, and
future generations will learn from it that women were articles of traffic in New York,
late in the nineteenth century of the Christian religion. It may hereafter prove a useful
document to antiquaries, who are .seeking to measure the progress of civilization in the
United States. I well know the value of that bit of paper; but much as I love freedom, I
do not like to look upon it. I am deeply grateful to the generous friend who procured it,
but I despise the miscreant who demanded payment for what never rightfully belonged to
him or his" (Jacobs, 200).
33Jacobs has Mrs. Bruce explain, when Jacobs arrives home, that "I did not buy you for
your services. I should have done just the same, if you had been going to sail for
California tomorrow. I should, at least, have the satisfaction of knowing that you left me
a free woman" (Jacobs, 200), and Jacobs repents of her initial reaction. In spite of this
careful explanation, I still see the dichotomy between the vehemence of Jacobs' initial
reaction and the humility of her final statement, a dichotomy which perhaps hides a
space between worth examining.
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clear that she does not want any obligations to Mrs. Bruce, suddenly "Love,
duty, gratitude also bind me to her side. It is a privilege to serve her who
pities my oppressed people" (italics mine). This servile language is a surprise
after Jacobs has made it quite clear that the purchase of her freedom "would
take from my sufferings the glory of triumph" (Jacobs, 199).
The second to last paragraph contradicts itself for a reason. The
paragraph begins with a sharp refusal to adopt "freedom" as an easy ending,
rather implying that the word as a metaphor "is not saying a great deal," then
moves through Jacobs' sense of non-fulfillment as a "free" woman and
mother, and ends with a humble thank-you to Mrs Bruce for granting her
"the inestimable boon of freedom." Jacobs suggests in this fracturing of
consistency, expectation, and "truth," a space between the polarized
understanding not only of black and white, but of slavery and freedom.
Freedom is not only destabilized in its non-implicated position as the
opposite of slavery, but it is also fundamentally questioned as an ontological
possibility, just as the very existence of "race" as a viable idea is called into
question by Jacobs' suggestion of the space between racial polarities. Jacobs'
presentation of Northern complicity with Southern slavery, contrasted in the
second to last paragraph with her servile relationship to Mrs. Bruce, serves to
complicate and question "freedom," which, in its constructed fundamental
difference from slavery, makes invisible the involvement of all Americans
with slavery. This "vision" problematizes race relations by linking
"freedom" with the conditions of slavery, thus implicating everyone,
including "her who pities my oppressed people," in those conditions.

.. .. ..
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Similar to the way the text of Incidents tacks back and forth in order to
suggest spaces between, so readings of the text have, across time, oscillated
between polarities, establishing various and differing authorities which
repolarize the destabilized elements in the text. Just as Jacobs' body could not
deconstruct the conceptual polarity of race in spite of her body's physical
manifestation of the hypocrisy of that construction, so the text has often been
read as an unfractured representative of one pole, as in Blassingame's
original insistence that the book is by a white woman, or as concealing
somewhere beneath its fractured surface an "authentic" and unfractured
Jacobs, as in Joanne M. Braxton's interpretation of Jacobs as the archetypical
"outraged mother" figure. But as critic Hazel Carby insists, in writing about
the conflicting ideologies of black and white womanhood under slavery,
"stereotypes only appear to exist in isolation while actually depending on a
nexus of figuration which' can be explained only in relation to each other"
(Carby, 20). The desire to claim an authentic black experience from Incidents,
or to take its ambiguous relationship to "white" language and forms as a sign
of its inauthenticity, ignores the constructedness of "black" experience as
opposite and separate from "white" experience. Jacobs' text does not contain
an incongruous use of "white" language and genre forms by a "black"
woman, or vice versa. It is an explosion of those forms from within, by
someone whose body and text are, in very complicated ways, at the "nexus of
[racial] figurations."
The tension which results from the use of "white" language and
"white" form has complicated readings of the text ever since it was written. If
we see that tension as a reconstruction/deconstruction of the ambiguities and
hypocrisies of the slave system itself, a system whose polarized ideologies of
race and gender "appear to exist in isolation while actually depending on a
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nexus of figurations which can be explained only in relation to each other,"
then the text's receptions begin to suggest as much if not more about the
understandings and cultural constructions of the people reading the book as
they do about the book itself. Acknowledging this, the reader becomes "free"
to recognize his or her position as historically and racially situated. To not do
this is to run the risk of reading the language and the form of the text as
simply and as stereotypically as Jacobs' enslaved body was read in the 1830s
and 40s. The racial blind spot, after all, has evolved along with American
society and still polarizes American vision ..
If recognizing one's own context is of utmost importance to the

reading of Incidents, it becomes necessary to recognize, in addition to Jacobs'
position as intermediary between her experience and her intended audience,
the reader's cultural, racial and historical position as itself an interlocutor
between text and understanding. The book begins with the word "reader,"
and continues throughout to address its audience directly, as in "But, 0, ye
happy women, whose purity has been sheltered from childhood, who have
been free to choose the objects of your affection, whose homes are protected by
law, do not judge the poor desolate slave girl too severely!" (Jacobs, 54). In
her plea, Jacobs makes it clear that the power of interpretation does not lie
with the reader in isolation. She contextualizes her readers, begging of those
for whom the laws, the interdictions, work, that they "do not judge... too
severely." The institution of "race" which creates the material and
conceptual differences between Jacobs and her audience, although greatly
altered by the passage of time and the resulting changes in society, are still, if
differently, with us today.34 The history of the reception of Incidents is as
34A. Leon Higgenbotham's epilogue helped me arrive at this thought. He writes of how
"Shortly before Chief Justice Earl Warren died, I spoke with him in great detail about
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much a history of black and white readers' relationships to the
manifestations of the polarized construction of race in their particular
America, as it is a history of readers' relationship to any single text. Thus, as I
will attempt to show, the resulting interpretations of the text say a great deal
about the cultural blind spots of the people reading it. Recognizing that my
reading is profoundly subjective and that I am very much the product and
mouthpiece of my own context,35 I would like, after examining three
responses to Jacobs, to suggest that just as the existence of conceptual blind
spots between the polarities which I see Jacobs as subtilely de constructing are
perhaps what we can hope most clearly to "see" while reading the text, so the
context of my own position in a history of receptions of Incidents is perhaps
what I can best "see" or at least acknowledge.
Published privately in December, 1860, Incidents did not enter the
market at a profitable time. As Jean Fagan Yellin puts it, "as the nation
moved toward civil war, yet another slave narrative seemed of minor
importance" (Introduction to Incidents, xxiv). The book attracted some
attention among white abolitionists, however, and in February, 1861, the

my ten year research effort on the issue of colonial slavery. He responded: 'I would be
especially interested in seeing you at this particular time because of a reappraisal of my
own thinking concerning slavery -- not only what it meant in the past but the danger of
what it will still mean to the future.' I concur with the concern expressed by Chief
Justice Warren that the impact of our heritage of slave laws will continue to make itself
felt into the future. For there is a nexus between the brutal centuries of colonial
slavery and the racial polarization and anxieties of today. The poisonous legacy of
legalized oppression based on the matter of color can never be adequately purged from
our society if we act as if slave laws had never existed" (Higgenbotham, 391).
35Although I am relegating my disclaimers to the end, I was never the less inspired by
Judith Butler's introduction to "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," after which she
writes, "I have begun with confessions of trepidation and a series of disclaimers, but
perhaps it will become clear that disc/aiming, which is no simple activity, will be what
I have to offer as a form of affirmative resistance to a certain regulatory operation of
homophobia [or, in this case, the regulatory operation of traditional academic reading
and writing which, as a matter of course, makes invisible and repolarizes blind spots]"
(Butler, 15).
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National Anti-Slavery Standard 36 ran a letter which, while it mainly

compared Incidents to Uncle Tom's Cabin, also discussed the book's own
merits, "approving its lack of sensationalism, and deploring its occasional
moralizing" (Introduction to Incidents, xxiv) This, then, was one
contemporary response to Incidents, written by a member (sex unidentified)
of the text's originally intended audience, and addressed to more members of
that audience. I have chosen to concentrate on it because, as a response
published in the National Anti-Slavery Standard, it reached a wide
abolitionist audience, and because it expresses a reading of the text which I
find interesting given the text's manipulation of genre and convention for
the benefit of exactly that audience:
It is by no means an extreme picture of the delicate institution.

The writer never suffers personal chastisement, and meets with
white friends who comfort and assist. Her chief persecutor, a
physician in good repute and practice, seems to have been
subjected to all restraints that Southern public opinion can put
on a professional man... A few sentences in which the moral is
rather oppressively displayed, might have been omitted with
advantage. These, it is to be wished, Mrs. Child had felt herself
authorized to expunge. " They are the strongest witnesses who
leave the summing up to the judge, and the verdict to the jury.
(Introduction to Incidents, xxiv).
This reaction to Incidents is an example of the antebellum reader's
insistence on the polarization of race, the polarization of North and South,
and the control of "black" experience and expression by "white" interlocutors.
The reader's blind spots, to the complicity of Northern whites in the

36Lydia Maria Child, Jacobs' .editor, edited the National Anti-Slavery Standard from
1841 to 1843. As "the first woman in America to edit a newspaper directed to an issue
of public policy" (Yellin, 56), Child had constantly to battle "the charge that her sex
would bias her work" (Yellin, 56). Yellin provides a very helpful discussion of the
complicated relationship between feminism and abolitionism throughout Women and
Sisters, and especially in relation to Child's tenure at the National Anti-Slavery
Standard on pp. 56-60.
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institution of slavery and to the constructedness of the polarity of race, are
stalwartly maintained. The book is recommended because it is deemed
palatable to its intended white audience. White people are not categorically ·
dismissed, and in fact, the reader can identify with "white friends who
comfort and assist." Thus reading the book as safely mediated, the white
reader does not have to acknowledge his or her complicity in the institution
of slavery.
That the book is described for what it doesn't do, rather than for what it
does, and the enigmatic terms "delicate institution" and "personal
chastisement," echo Incident's own carefUl maneuverings around what could
and couldn't be said to polite white women. What, for example, does
"personal chastisement" mean? Jacobs certainly suffers verbal abuse, and she
is once struck down by Dr. Flint. Is the reader alluding to the fact that Jacobs is
not raped by Dr. Flint?37 Equally enigmatic is the description of Dr. Flint's
position in Southern society, which discusses the ways which he is restrained,
something Jacobs never does, as opposed to how he is violently manipulative
and abusive. The book is praised not for its representation of "the delicate
institution," but for its representation of whites.
The white reader, reassured, is then reminded of the mediating
presence of Lydia Maria Child. What fault this writer finds, he or she blames
not on Jacobs' skill as an author, but on Child's lack of control over the text.
Did this writer mean by "the moral" those places where Jacobs condemns the
institution of slavery? Or those places where Jacobs implicates the North in
the institution of slavery? Or where Jacobs calls the white women of the
North to action? Whichever of those moments of direct exhortation and
371f so, "personal chastisement" is a very telling euphemism, chastisement carrying
with it the implication of some misdemeanor.
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undisguised intent this writer may be referring to, he or she effectively
dis empowers those moments by transferring the "authority" of the text to
Lydia Maria Child. This writer is not interested in "the moral." Rather he or
she wishes that Child had taken a greater role as interlocutor between the text
and the white readership. The excerpt concludes with the writer's opinion
that "They are the strongest witnesses who leave the summing up the judge,
and the verdict to the jury." Suffice it to say that in the Northern and
Southern United (or disunited) States in 1861, judges and juries were
comprised solely of white· men. Authority is thus transferred to Child and
the readers, through a reference to the institutionalized arbiters who upheld
and maintained the legal interdictions which naturalized white supremacy in
the United States. Clearly this reader, by using the metaphor of the court,
solidly maintains his or her blind spots to the constructedness of the
polarized understanding of race.
Having made a small impact in the early 1860's, Incidents quickly fell
into obscurity, probably due to the emancipation of the slaves and the slow
dissolution of the abolitionist movement. As Yellin relates, when the book
was remembered, it was remembered confusedly: "Some thought it a
narrative dictated by a fugitive slave, Jacobs, to Child; others thought it an
antislavery novel that Child had written in the form of a slave narrative"
(Introduction to Incidents, xxv).

Thus, when John Blassingame discounted

the "veracity" of Incidents in his influ.e ntial 1972 history, The Slave
Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South, he was responding
not only to what he saw in the text, but to a history of confused and
ambivalent readings of it which had placed it partially if not wholly in the
hands of a white writer.
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The Slave Community was a very influential history of slavery, one of

the first, as Blassingame himself notes, to "explore ... the life experiences of
American slaves" (Blassingame, vii). He relied heavily upon slave
narratives to determine "how blacks felt about the conditions under which
they lived" (Blassingame, 228), but in order to research this, Blassingame had
to confront the idea that "few men are able to tell the whole truth about
themselves," and the question of whether or not any given narrative is
"representative" and "reliable." Very concerned with the issue of authority
and veracity, Blassingame provides a "Critical Essay on Sources" at the end of
his book, in which he explains his methods of verification, and explains why
two narratives, Aunt Sally: Or the Cross the Way to Freedom, and Incidents
in the Life of a Slave Girl, do not stand up to his criteria. 38 Although he has

since reversed his opinion, in 1972 Blassingame maintained that "in spite of
Lydia Maria Child's insistence that she had only revised the manuscript of
Harriet Jacobs 'mainly for the purpose-of condensation and orderly
arrangement,' the work is not credible" (Blassingame, 234). Where the 1861
reader found Child's presence too diluted, Blassingame a century later finds
the text too mediated: "In the first place, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl is
too orderly; too many of the major characters meet providentially after years
of separation.... Then, too, the story is too melodramatic: miscegenation
and cruelty, outraged virtue, unrequited love, and planter licentiousness
appear on practically every page" (Blassingame, 234). In addition to a blind
spot regarding gender, Blassingame's blind spot polarizes the conventions of
38Blassingame's methods are clearly sexist. Not only are the two discounted narratives
by women, but Blassingame consistently refers to slaves as "he." The most glaring
example of this that I found was the way in which he introduced one of the women's
narratives: "In some of the fictional accounts, the major character may have been a real
fugitive, but the narrative of his life is probably false. Aunt Sally: Or the Cross the
Way to Freedom . .. is a good example of the type" (Blassingame, 233).
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sentimentality and the conventions of slave narrative, which amounts to a
polarization of truth and falsehood.

He condemns the narrative for exactly

those adoptions of the sentimental convention which made it palatable to its
1861 white female audience, while acknowledging none of the complicated
manipulations of that convention which suggest exactly the spaces between
polarities which his reading is blind to, namely, the space between truth and
fiction, authority and non-authority. The text emerges, still powerfully
enigmatic, from between a reading by a Civil War era white reader who could
accept nothing Jacobs said unmediated, and a reading by a 1972 black historian
for whom the mediating genre choice spelled falsehood.
In 1981 Jean Fagan Yellin was able, through the use of letters and
meticulous historical research, to "authenticate Uacobs'] authorship"
(Introduction to Incidents, xxv). Since that time the book has received
enormous academic attention, to the extent that it was taught in three
different classes at Oberlin just this semester. 39 This official authentication,
combined with a contemporary movement on the part of some black
feminists to define an essence of black femaleness,40 prepared the ground for
Joanne M. Braxton's 1986

Massachuse~ts

Review article, "Harriet Jacobs'

Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: The Re"-Definition of the Slave Narrative

Genre." In this article Braxton outlines what she sees as the distinctions
between men's and women's slave narratives, establishing for black
American women "a mystic sisterhood. .. we live our lives within a magic
39These classes were: American Women's History, Black Women in America, and
American Romanticism.
40Th is is, of course, still a current issue in many feminisms, some defined as and/or
defining themselves as "white," some defined as and/or defining themselves as "black."
For a good discussion of the issues and problems in black feminist theory current in
1986, see Hazel Carby's chapter, "Women's Era: Rethinking Black Feminist Theory," in
Reconstructing Womanhood. This chapter speaks strongly against "essentialism," a
"position" I align myself witb.
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circle, a realm of shared language, reference, and allusion within the veil of
our blackness and our femaleness" (Braxton, 379). Braxton employs
unfortunate and reductive stereotypes in order to place Harriet Jacobs in the
position of the "outraged mother/' an archetype who, "With her hands on
her hips and her head covered with a bandana" stands "at the core of our
black and female experience, this American Amazon of African descent,
dwelling in the moral and psychic wilderness of North America" (Braxton,
380). The textual example Braxton uses to establish Jacobs' archetypal black
motherhood, however, undermines her very assertion of that point. She
writes, "The outraged mother resists her situation not so much on behalf of
herself as on behalf of her children... 'I knew the doom that awaited my fair
baby in slavery, and I determined to save her from it, or perish in the
attempt'" (Braxton,387). In this quote, intended to illustrate Jacobs' essential
)

nature as a black woman, Jacobs specifically names her daughter's skin color,
"fair," thus alluding to the heightened sexual commodification of lightskinned slave women. Again, through one little word slipped in, Jacobs
suggests the fallacy of the naturalizing myth of "race," which in antebellum
American supposedly justified slave status based on an immutable polarity of
skin color, but which was in fact a violently reinforced ontology of oppression
founded on legal and linguistic interdictions. In my opinion, the quote
Braxton chose points to the blind spot between the polarized construction of
race, a blind spot Braxton herself reins'cribes in her article.
And so I come to the momento! this thesis. Today, April 20th, 1993, I
got on the elevator at Main Level, interrupting the conversation of three
black women who then rode in silence with me up to the third floor. The
elevator stopped and before the door opened, one of them said to another, or
to me, "Someone had better erase that before the wrong person reads it." I
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looked at the elevator wall as I walked out behind them. "Rodney King
Deserved It" was scrawled in ballpoint pen next to the emergency stop switch.
And I unlocked my scholar study and sat down at my computer to
write the conclusion to a long academic paper about how the trope of "race,"
which is still violently enacted and reenacted in America, is handled by
Harriet Jacobs and the readers of Incidents. Legal and linguistic interdictions.
Spaces between. Blind spots. Suggestions. Myself, white, writing about
Harriet Jacobs, black, writing.
Who was the wrong person, if not them, if not me? Based on where
this thesis has led me, I wonder if the four of us in that elevator weren't
already tied together in a silence which at least for me was based on "race," on
my fear of "race," my desire to situate myself on the "right" side of the
polarities resulting from "race," my fears that all I do, or all I can do, is occupy
the "wrong" pole, the oppressive, appropriative, racist pole. Didn't the
writing on the wall tie us together in a polarity of identity based on "race?"
Weren't we all readers, though very different readers, of "race," of the brutal
re-enforcement of "race," and weren't we brutalized into polarized categories,
not for the first time, but again, as we are, and as I know I unconsciously
facilitate, through tinier brutalities many times a day? I do not mean to
suggest that "white," because it is constantly repolarized over against "black"
is therefore a sister in oppression. I mean that the violence, directed from
"white" against "black" of "Rodney King Deserved It," given the legal history
of the Rodney King beating and its aftermath, recalls present day legal
interdictions as well as enacts linguistic interdictions which help construct
and maintain a radically unbalanced and oppressive understanding of "race"
in America.

This institutionalized white supremacy, recreated constantly in

American culture, makes it impossible for me, in reading and writing about
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Incidents, to divorce myself from my context as a white woman. Incidents,
after all, is not primarily about the ways, powerful or disturbing, that "black"
and "white" cultures, informed as they are by "race", play themselves out
independently of one another, but rather speaks from and to the violence and
silencing which African Americans suffered in the antebellum United States
when people came into contact as "black" and "white," polarized against and
therefore defined in violent relation to one another. Given that history, and
the history of racial interdictions in America since then, I can only read
Incidents as a woman who is white, a white woman trying to see through the
use of inter diction in the text, the blind spots in my culture and myself which
reproduce "race" at every turn.
But looking for my own blind spots is, as I wrote in a very different
context many pages ago, an act of looking which is impossible, although
perhaps it is all I can do, vigilantly, constantly. To try, vigilantly and
constantly, to recognize the violent constructedness of the pole of "race" I
occupy, and acknowledge my own complicity in that construction. And in
doing so, I hope I become a woman who is white writing consciously about
race. More explicitly, I hope I become ani other white woman reading
Incidents not only to reach "a realizing sense of the condition of two millions
of women at the South, still in bondage," but to reach some sort of
understanding about myself personally as a "raced" American, and about my
cultural, intellectual, economic and political circumstances as they affect and
are implicated in the cultural, intellectual, economic and political
circumstances of other, differently "raced" Americans.

I hope that my

attempts to recognize, to "see" where others have stood and where I stand in
relation to Incidents, and how those positions have functioned and still
function in the construction of "race" as a whole are, if not helpful to other
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readers of Incidents at least a step in a good direction for me personallYJ in
J

my relationship to my positionJ responsibilityJ and future as an active and
hopefully contributing white American woman.
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